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Introduction
There is a considerable body of literature documenting the significant first-day
returns of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). These returns have been economically and
statistically large, particularly during the "bubble" period of 1999-2000, during
which the average first-day return was approximately 65%. Further, Loughran and
Ritter (2002) find that finns, on average, leave approximately $9.1 million on the
table, which is roughly twice the amount of direct fees paid. The question this raises
is: Why do issuers accept such a large amount of money left on the table (MLOT)?
Many potential explanations exist for this large opportunity cost; however, one
that fonns the basis for mUltiple theoretical models is asymmetric infonnation
between buyers and sellers (e.g., Rock 1986; Benveniste and Spindt 1989). We
examine this particular explanation in the context of Real Estate Investment Trust
(REIT) IPOs, hypothesizing this type ofIPO is inherently more transparent (i.e., less
infonnation asymmetry) and should therefore experience a lower cost of issuance.
In general, there are several reasons REIT IPOs should be less difficult to value
than traditional issues. For example, equity REUs report the portfolio of buildings
and other tangible assets they hold, which can then be used to estimate occupancy,
rent payments, and cash flow. In contrast, traditional issues may not have as
extensive a set of information on underlying asset holdings. Therefore, the future
cash flows of REUs may be less uncertain than those associated with a traditional
issue, where the assets are largely unknown (particularly to investors) or, at the least,
difficult to value since they are typically less tangible.
Several studies have examined the level of information asymmetry and the
corresponding level of underpricing for REIT IPOs. For example, Wang et al. (1992)
document a 2.82% price decline on the first day of trading for a sample of REIT
IPOs issued during the period of 1971-1988. However, Ling and Ryngaert (1997)
examine the 1991-1994 period and find average first-day returns of 3.60%. They
attribute this turnaround (at least partially) to an increased difficulty associated with
valuing more recent REU IPOs, although the level of underpricing is still lower
compared to traditional IPO finns.
Most of these prior studies measure the costs associated with information
asymmetry using first-day return (i.e., initial underpricing). However, an alternative
branch of research (e.g., Barry 1984; Dolvin and Jordan 2007) suggests another
method for measuring issue costs that accounts for the share retention (i.e.,
overhang) decisions of preexisting owners. Specifically, initial underpricing is
defined as money left on the table relative to offering proceeds, which implicitly
assumes all preexisting shares are sold in the offering; however, this is rarely the
case. Therefore, a more reasonable measure, particularly from the perspective of
preexisting owners, may be money left on the table relative to preexisting equity
value, which effectively controls for the level of share retention by preexisting
owners. Following Dolvin and Jordan (2007), we refer to this measure as the
opportunity cost of issuance (OCI).
REUs, as a whole, are less likely to have preexisting shares, simply based on the
structure of the industry; therefore, a comparison of underpricing to more traditional
issues may be less meaningful than previously thought. Thus, results of existing
studies mayor may not reflect the true cost of going public in these relatively unique
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investment assets. Similarly, the use of "umbrella partnerships," which began in
1992, may also impact the issue cost comparison. In this fonn of REIT, one or more
individuals contribute real estate holdings to the partnership in exchange for
operating units. Although these units are not technically shares of stock (and thus
would not show up in preexisting equity), the operating units are convertible to
shares of stock, effectively making them "share-like" securities. Thus, in calculating
the opportunity cost of issuance, it is also necessary to control for this structure.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on REIT IPOs in a number of
ways. First, many prior studies examine REIT IPOs in isolation. We examine both
traditional IPOs and REIT IPOs in an effort to focus on the specific differences in the
two types of issues and the variables that influence those differences. Second, rather
than examining only underpricing, we also focus on the OCI, which controls for the
level of share retention by preexisting owners. Third, we examine whether the type of
REIT IPO (i.e., equity vs. mortgage) is influential in predicting issue cost. For each
segment of the analysis, we further control for the use of umbrella partnerships
(upREITs), which may impact the level of share retention and therefore the OCI.
We find, consistent with previous studies, that REIT IPOs have lower initial-day
returns relative to traditional IPOs, most likely due to the reduced complexity of
valuing the assets that comprise the REIT IPOs. We find further evidence of this in
smaller offer price revisions, which is also consistent with reduced infonnation
asymmetry. However, when controlling for the level of share retention, which is
lower for REITs, the reduction in risk associated with less uncertainty in valuation
does not result in lower issuance costs for existing owners. This result is robust to
controlling for the UPREIT structure. Thus, although REIT underpricing is lower,
the difference in preissuance share structure results in an OCI that is statistically the
same. Continuing to control for the UPREIT structure, we also find that the type of
REIT (i.e., mortgage or equity) is immaterial to the level of OCI, as both types
exhibit approximately the same level relative to traditional IPOs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: "lnfonnation AsymJ11cuy and
the Cost of Going Public" discusses informational asymmetries and the resulting
issuance costs in IPOs. "RElT JPOs" briefly discusses the structure of REIT issuances.
"Datil and Methods" presents data and methods. "Results" presents results, and Section
"Conclusions" concludes.

Information Asymmetry and the Cost of Going Public
Theoretical models of infonnation asymmetry have provided a framework for
explaining IPO "mispricing" (see Rock 1986). The existence of asymmetric
infonnation forces issuers to offer shares at a discount (relative to the true market
value of the issuing firm), which implies a positive relation between the degree of
asymmetric information and issuance costs. Previous studies generally address this
relation by examining underpricing, or the initial-day return, which is defined as
money left on the table (MLOT) divided by the proceeds of the offering. 1
I Underpricing is often defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing market price
on the first day of trading; however, these are equivalent definitions.
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It is important to note that underpricing fails to control for the number of shares
retained by preexisting owners. In fact, as mentioned earlier, underpricing implicitly
assumes that all preexisting shares are sold in the offering, which is generally not the
case. As an extreme example, consider a firm that goes public by issuing a single
share. Any level of underpricing is essentially irrelevant since its dilutive effect on
the value of the firm would be so small, and the money left on the table would be
minor in comparison to the overall stake of preexisting owners.
Put differently, the wealth effect on preexisting owners (i.e., MLOT) is
determined by the risk of the offering, including the amount of asymmetric
infonnation, not by the share issuance decision. Thus, studies focusing on
underpricing mayor may not reach accurate conclusions regarding the underlying
relations between characteristics of the offer and the cost of going public,
particularly in situations where industry ownership structure is systematically
different, such as the case with REUs. Specifically, firms that have high
underpricing may actually have a relatively low issuance cost if owners retain a
large portion of shares. Alternatively, preexisting owners of finns with lower
underpricing may not benefit from this relation ifvery few shares are retained, which
is generally the case for REUs and, in particular, for non-UPREU firms. We
examine whether this latter scenario is significant to the cost of issuance for REU
lPOs.
Following Barry (l984), Dolvin and Jordan (2007) formally address the relation
between underpricing and the true wealth effect of an IPO, finding that underpricing
is the product of two underlying components: the wealth effect and the share
retention (i.e., overhang) decision. Dolvin and Jordan define the wealth effect in
percentage terms, which they refer to as the opportunity cost of issuance (OCI):

OCI = _M_L_O_T = -::-N---:o-,:-(P_1_-.,. . ,----OP---=)'_=_
E
P1NA - NopOP

(1)

where E represents the preexisting equity value and is equal to the market value of
the firm after the offering, less any new proceeds raised from newly created (i.e.,
plimary) shares. (Note, any secondary shares sold create proceeds for selling
shareholders, not for the firm itself.) In addition, No is the number of shares offered
in the IPO; P j is the market price at the end of the first trading day; OP is the offer
price; N A is the total number of shares after the offering; and No,p is the number of
primary (i.e., newly created) shares offered. Their derivation and results suggest that
failing to control for the share retention decision introduces potential bias; therefore,
in examining the relation between information asymmetry and the cost of going
public, we study both initial-day underpricing and OCI.

REIT IPOs
REUs were originally designed as a conservative investment device through
which individual investors could invest in real estate assets on a long-term basis.
Thus, REUs have historically served the role of financial intermediaries that
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enable individuals to invest in real estate assets, yet avoid the double taxation
associated with traditional corporate structures by complying with strict operating
requirements. 2 There are two basic types of RElTs. Equity RElTs are involved in the
investment and operation of real physical assets, while mortgage RElTs purchase
3
mortgage obligations.
Prior to the Tax Refo lID Act of 1986, RElTs were precluded from actively
managing their own portfolio. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) provide an in-depth
discussion of the different environments before and after the Tax Refonn Act. Most
notably, the post Act period is associated with a substantially higher level of
managerial equity ownership. With increased preexisting ownership, share overhang
becomes a more relevant variable and influences the applicability, or lack thereof, of
initial-day underpricing as a measure of issuance costs. An additional result of this
more active management style is more uncertainty about the market value of the
finn.
Wang et a!. (1992) suggest two additional reasons RElT IPOs may behave
differently than traditional industry issues. First, REIT issues prior to 1990 had more
uninfonned investors. However, the significantly lower levels of underpricing
persisted throughout the 1990s even though the level of institutional ownership in
REITs was as high as industrial issues (see Chan et al. 1998). Therefore, it appears
this conjecture does not well explain the differing levels of underpricing.
Another possible reason for the different levels of IPO underpricing suggested by
Wang et al. (1992) is that REITs hold tangible assets (real properties and mortgages),
whereas the asset base for industrial IPOs can be much more undefined. Chan et al.
(200 I) examine this last explanation using Hong Kong IPOs and find evidence
suggesting the difference in underlying assets cannot completely explain the
difference in underpricing between the two types of issues. Therefore, they conclude
there is a need to re-evaluate current explanations for the abnormal perfonnances of
RElT IPOs relative to traditional issues.
As identified earlier, an additional REIT structure may influence the level of
issue costs faced by preexisting owners. Umbrella partnerships, which comprise
over half of the largest RElTs, allow partners that contribute property to the RElT
to receive operating units rather than shares. The structure, due to the
convertibility of units to shares, allows partners to retain an effective ownership
interest, while also reducing the initial tax burden associated with the fonnation of
the partnership. If we were to calculate OCI (money left on the table relative to
preexisting equity value) without controlling for these units, we would effectively
underestimate preexisting equity and overestimate issuance costs. So, we
necessarily adjust for this type of REIT.

2

See Fass et al. (I <)%) and Jarchow (I <J8S) for an explanation of REIT operating procedures.

Hybrid REITs, which could be considered a third type, invest in both physical and financial assets.
These, however, make up a small fraction of the REIT population.
3
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Data and Methods
We examine a sample of issues that went public between 1986 and 2004. Prior to
1986, many of the explanatory variables of interest are unreported or unreliable.
Following traditional studies, we omit issues involving closed-end funds, unit issues,
American depositary shares, mutual-to-stock conversions, reverse leveraged buy
outs, and spin-offs. Unlike most studies, we also eliminate from our analyses firms
with multiple share classes. 4 The reason these issues are eliminated is that the
detennination of overhang, and therefore OCI, can be problematic for such firms,
particularly when, for example, one Class A share can be converted into multiple
Class B shares.
We gather information on IPOs from the SNL Financial and SDC New Issues
databases. In addition to company and issue information provided by SNL and SDC,
we rely on the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database to provide closing market prices and information on shares
outstanding on the date of issuance. We also use Loughran and Ritter's (2004)
underwriter reputation variables and firm founding dates. Our final sample consists
of 5,606 issues, 5,397 of which are traditional issues and 209 that are REIT issues.
SNL also identifies REITs by type (mortgage, equity, or hybrid) and additionally
identifies issues as UPREITs. Of the 209 REITS, 112 are UPREITs, which is
approximately 54% of our sample. However, UPREITs did not exist prior to 1992,
and after this time approximately 65% of our sample has the UPREIT structure. To
determine the number of operating units that existed in each UPREIT at the issuance
date, we consult prospectus and filing documents on the SEC's website. Table 1
presents summary statistics for the entire sample.
Panel A of Table I presents the variables designed to measure information
asymmetry and issue costs. Initial is the initial-day return, defined as the percentage
change from the offer price to the price at close of the first day of trading. This
variable is equivalent to that used in the majority of IPO studies to capture the
relative level of MLOT. OCI is the opportunity cost of issuance, as defined in Eq. 1.
AdjOCI is also calculated using Eq. 1; however, preexisting equity is adjusted to
reflect umbrella partnership operating units that are equivalent to common shares.
Unfortunately, for 21 issues we are unable to obtain the number of partnership units;
therefore, we eliminate these from our comparison for AdjOCl. ShareOver is share
overhang, defined as the number of shares retained (by existing shareholders)
relative to the total number of shares issued. AdjShareOver is share overhang
adjusted for UPREIT operating units. Finally, Revision is a measure of offer price
revisions, defined as the offer price less the initial low filing price, divided by the
difference between the initial high and low filing prices.
These variables measure the extent of information asymmetries in various ways.
Initial and OCI (and AdjOCI) measure the extent of direct issuance costs, reflecting
the difference between the offering price and the resulting market price. In other

4 There are 410 non-RElTs with dual class shares. This structure is non-existent in RElTs, which may be
attributable to the use of umbrella partnerships.
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words, they retlect the difference between the pre-issue valuation and the market
driven response to the issuance. Revision is designed to measure the pre-issue
uncertainty sun'ounding the issue. When there is considerable asymmetry sUlTound
ing an issue, the pre-issue filing prices may be substantially adjusted to respond to
new information that may reduce those informational deficiencies.
Examining Panel A, we find each of the issue cost variables is significantly
different for REIT IPOs relative to traditional issues, Consistent with prior studies
(e.g. Wang et al. 199:? and Ling and Ryngaert 1997), we find a lower level of
underpricing for RElT IPOs, possibly attributable to the lower degree of valuation
uncertainty. We also find REITs to be associated with smaller pre-offer revisions.
Interestingly, however, we find that REIT IPOs have higher OCI than traditional
issues. Although not as large, this relation is robust to controlling for umbrella
partnerships.
Thus, we have conflicting univariate evidence in that Initial appears to indicate a
lower cost of issuance for REIT LPOs, while OCI (and AdjOCI) indicates a higher
cost of issuance. This may be explained by ShareOver, which indicates a much
[ower level of share retention associated with REIT issues. Thus, our preliminary
results suggest that although prior studies conclude REITs have a lower cost of
issuance, our evidence suggests, in contrast, this relationship is of limited benefit to
preexisting owners and may simply be a function of industry structure.
The results to this point fail to account for underlying issue characteristics that
may also be influencing the relations. Thus, to explore potential causes of the
above differences, we report descriptive statistics on selected finn and offer
characteristics in Panel B of Table 1. The variables in the panel are representative of
those commonly examined in IPO research, but the list is not intended to be
exhaustive. Specifically, we report means and t statistics from difference tests for the
following:
Proceeds
Integer
Rank
Primary
CrspYWI5
PartialU
PartialD
Nineties
2000s

Gross proceeds of the issue in millions of dollars
Dummy variable equal to one if the LPO offer price is an integer
Carter-Manaster (1990) rank of the lead underwriter, as updated by
Loughran and Ritter (2004)
Dummy variable equal to one if the offering has 100 percent primary
shares
The CRSP value weighted index return for the 15 trading days prior to
the issue
The percentage change (fi'om the OIiginal midfile) in the final offer
price if the change is positive (and zero otherwise)
The percentage change (from the original midfile) in the final offer
price if the change is negative (and zero otherwise)
Dummy variable equal to one if the issue takes place in the 1990 to
1998 period; and
Dummy variable equal to one if the issue takes place in the 2000 to
2004 peliod

Proceeds is a common conditioning variable in the LPO literature. For example, a
larger offering may be indicative of less risk, as larger firms generally have more
publicly available information. If so, then the risk of going public may be lower,
resulting in a lower issuance cost. Previous studies, however, generally find an
inconsistent relation between size and issuance cost across time periods. Nonethe
less, controlling for size is particularly important for REITs given their large average
size relative to traditional issues.
Bradley et al. (2004) show that IPOs with integer offer prices tend to be more
underpriced. They argue that integer prices are, in paJ1, a sign of valuation
uncertainty, which leads to a greater reward to new shareholders. We again
hypothesize that this payment, in the fOlm of MLOT, will come at the expense of
existing shareholders.
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Third-party agents such as underwriters may serve in a certification role, thereby
reducing the risk of the offering (e.g., Dolvin 2005). However, previous studies find
these agents are often associated with higher MLOT. This may be attributable to
"grandstanding" (Gompers 1996), which is designed to attract future business. Thus,
the predicted relation of Rank to OCI is undetermined.
From our previous discussion, it is apparent that an increased level of overhang
should serve to reduce the wealth lost by preexisting shareholders. It is possible,
however, that in certain circumstances issuers may be constrained in their decisions
on the optimal level of share retention. One such case involves issues where owners
are retaining 100% of their shares. At this level, any additional increase in
underpricing may directly result in a higher OCr. Thus, we examine Primary,
hypothesizing that pure primary offerings (i.e., full retention of secondary shares)
will be associated with a higher Initial and OCr.
We also examine the overall market's return (value weighted) for the IS trading
days prior to the issue (CRSPYW I5). This variable proxies for "hot" issuance
markets and is generally positively associated with underpricing, although not
necessarily OCI, as owners typically retain more shares in such times. Dolvin and
Jordan (2007) find that offer price adjustments, particularly upward, result in a
higher OCI, a result that is consistent with similar findings related to Initial. Thus,
we examine PartialU and Pm1iaID.
Lastly, we code each issue by time period. Particularly during the internet
"bubble," IPOs as a whole expetienced higher issuance costs. However, Hat1Zell et
al. (2005) find that such "hot" time periods are not significantly related to post-IPO
REIT operating performance. Thus, this particular variable may be less relevant for
REITs.
Examining Panel B of Table I, it appears that REIT IPOs tend be significantly
larger and have higher quality underwriters relative to traditional issues. Also, REIT
IPOs have lower levels of upward and downward price revision, which is consistent
with results for Revision. Moreover, REIT issues are less likely to be priced on an
integer. We also find that REITs are more likely to be 100% primary issues.
Generally, this indicates higher share retention (overhang); however, as noted above
this is not the case. Thus, there must be some underlying difference in structure.
Specifically, the relations suggest that there are very few preexisting shares, at least
relative to traditional issues. So, even if all shares are retained, the number of new
shares created is so large in comparison that overhang, as a whole, is extremely low.
This is simply a function of industry structure and the configuration of REIT
securities in that REITs are primarily formed using the new proceeds generated from
the issue. This relation is robust, however, to controlling for UPREITs. So, even in
this structure where a greater number of preexisting "shares" exists, they are small
relative to new proceeds gathered.
It appears there may be significant differences between the two types of
investments in relation to issuance costs. However, various issue charactetistics are
also significantly different, and this could be dtiving those results. Therefore, we
implement more robust statistical analyses using a matched sample. More
specifically, we match each REIT issue to a traditional issue by size and issue date.
We present summary statistics for this matched sample in Table 2. The primary
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difference we find is that AdjOCI is no longer significantly larger for RElT issues.
We attribute this change to the greater consistency in size, which is the only other
result that changes; however, we further explore this, and other possibilities, in the
multivariate analysis contained in the subsequent section.

Results
Information Asymmetry and Issue Cost
To control for underlying relations, we continue our analysis by estimating the
following OLS regression model:

DePi = 0 + (3, REIT + (32 ShareOver + (33 LnProceeds + (34 Rank + (35 Primary
+(36 Integer + ,6 7 PartialU + (38 PartialD + (39 CrspVWIS + (3'0 Nineties
+(3,,2000s + Ci

(2)
5

where the Depi is either Initial, OCI, AdjOCI, or Revision RElT is a dummy
variable that equals one for the 209 RElT rpO issues, zero otherwise. If RElT issues
are associated with a lower level of pricing uncertainty, this should result in lower
levels of information asymmetry. This will then result in a negative relation between
RElT and the issue cost variables. We also include the variable SharcOver in the
regression to control for the level of share retention, since the univariate analysis
suggests this variable IS important in determining the cost of issuance to preexisting
owners. Based on the rationale presented earlier, we also include each independent
variable identified in Panel B of Table 1. The results are presented in Table 3.
We find the predicted negative relation in regards to Initial, indicating that REIT
issues have significantly lower levels of underpricing. Specifically, a REIT IPO
experiences, on average, 4.61 % (absolute) lower underpricing than a comparable
traditional issue. This is consistent with the belief that REIT issues are easier to value
and therefore are associated with less information asymmetry and lower values of
MLOT. We fmd supporting evidence in the specification where the dependent
variable is Revision, although the significance is marginal (p value=O.l 0).
However, as previously discussed, an alternative measure of issuance cost is the
cost to existing shareholders, as some issues have a significant percentage of the
shares retained within the preexisting ownership structure while other issues have no
preexisting shares. Therefore, OCI may be a more appropriate measure of issuance
costs, particularly given the preexisting ownership structure of the RElT industry.
We find the relation between REIT and OCI to be insignificant, indicating that any
reduced cost of issuance is not necessarily to the benefit of the existing owners.
Examining AdjOCI, we find that the estimated coefficient switches to the
predicted negative sign, which would indicate lower issuance costs. However, the
coefficient is only significant at a relatively low level, indicating our results are
robust to controlling for ownership units in UPREITs. Therefore, models such as
Wang et a1. (1992) and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) that find RElT fPOs to be
associated with a relatively lower cost of issuance may be capturing a different
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phenomenon than true opportunity costs, which may simply be a bias of the different
ownership structure within the REIT industry.
Types of REITs
To extend previous work, we also examine the type of REIT issue. As mentioned in
a earlier section, there are two distinct types of REITs: (I) Equity and (2) Mortgage.
There is a natural difference between the two types in tenns of investment securities.
For example, mortgage REITs may be different in that the underlying securities are
easier to value than those of equity REITs. Specifically, it is likely easier to sum the
amount of monthly mortgage notes due than to appraise the value of properties. On
the other hand, there is likely a higher risk of default with mOligage REITs than
equity REITs, as they are not directly associated with a physical asset base. Beyond
underlying asset holdings, a significant additional difference exists between
mortgage and equity REIT-i.e., the UPREIT structure is typically confined to
equity REITs. These differences provide the incentive needed in segmenting the
sample. We identify 39 mortgage and 156 equity issues. The remaining issues are
identified as hybrids, which are excluded to allow for a clearer analysis of the
relative risks of each issue. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.
We find no significant differences between the two samples in the univariate
analysis in any of the issue cost measures (Initial, OCI, and AdjOCI) or price
revisions. We do find, though, that mortgage issues are more likely to be priced on
an integer and are associated with lower quality underwriters. We also find more
equity issues in the 1990s and a higher prevalence of mortgage issues in the 2000s.
To further examine the distinction between the two types of REIT issues, we
estimate the coefficients of the following model using a matched sample of REIT
lPOs (excluding Hybrids) and traditional (non-REII) lPOs:

Depi

= a + /31 Mortgage + /32 Equity + /33 ShareOver + /34LnProceeds
+/35 Rank + /36 Primary + /37 Integer + /38 PartialU + /39 PartialD
+/310CrspVW15 +/311 Nineties +/3122000s +Ei

(3)

where Mortgage (Equity) is a dummy variable equal to one if the REIT issue is a
mortgage (equity), zero otherwise. Results are presented in Table 5, including an F
test between the coefficients on Mortgage and Equity. We find both REIT types are
negatively related to Initial, which is similar to our earlier findings, and there appears
to be no significant difference between the two REIT types. A similar relation exists
for offer price revisions, although the coefficient on Mortgage is not significant.
In contrast, the insignificant relation between REIT and OCI in Table 3 appears to
be driven by differing relations between mortgage and equity REITs. An F test
indicates the difference between the coefficients on equity and mortgage REITs is
significant, which suggesls mortgage REITs have lower costs to existing owners
than equity REITs. However, since adjusted share overhang is higher for equity
REITs, we hypothesize the difference is attributable to the use of umbrella
partnerships, which is a structure unique to equity REITS. This conjecture is
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consistent with the results related to adjusted OCl, which indicate an insignificant
relation between both types of REITs and AdjOCI. Further, the F test indicates no
statistical difference between the two coefficients. Thus, once we control for umbrella
partnerships, the type of REIT appears to be unimportant in determining the level of
indirect issue cost.

Conclusions
We compare REIT lPOs that went public between 1986 and 2004 to traditional
issues during that same time period. We find that REIT issues are associated with
lower levels of issue cost, at least as typically defined by initial-day underpricing.
Further, we find that REIT issues are associated with lower offer price revisions,
which is consistent with reduced information asymmetries. However, when using an
alternative method for estimating issue costs, we find no significant difference
between the two groups of lPOs. This alternative measure proxies for the cost to
preexisting owners. Therefore, our findings suggest that although underpricing
appears to be lower, the total cost of REIT lPOs to preexisting owners is about the
same as traditional issues. We attribute the difference to the inherent nature of share
ownership in the REIT industry.
We further segment our sample into mortgage and equity REITs, the latter of
which is more likely to employ umbrella partnerships. Once we control for the
additional preexisting ownership base for this specific ownership structure, we find
no significant relation between either type of REIT and the opportunity cost of
issuance. Thus, we find no evidence of existing owners of either REIT type having
an incremental advantage (i.e., lower costs of issuance) over the other.
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